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Abstract: My dissertation examines whether audit committee deliberations are associated 
with financial reporting quality. This is important because audit committees are 
responsible for overseeing the integrity of the firm’s internal controls over financial 
reporting, accounting and reporting practices, financial statements, and external auditors. 
However, little is known about the nature of their deliberations, because this information 
is not available for publicly-traded companies. In contrast, this information is available 
for many universities, which are operating more like for-profit entities as the competition 
for students increases and financial resources become more scarce. Using a unique 
sample of minutes from universities’ audit committee meetings, I first identify the topics 
of deliberation contained within these minutes. I then examine which specific audit 
committee deliberations are associated with the likelihood of severe deficiencies in 
internal control, my proxy for financial reporting quality. I find that internal audit and 
financial statements are the two most frequently discussed audit committee topics. 
However, the discussions that have the strongest negative association with the likelihood 
of internal control deficiencies are those that address internal controls, audit committee 
expertise, and the audit committee charter. These results provide useful information 
regarding audit committee deliberations, information that is unavailable for publicly-
traded companies, and aid our understanding of how audit committees influence the 
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Audit committees are responsible for overseeing the integrity of the firm’s internal controls over 
financial reporting, accounting and reporting practices, financial statements, and the selection and 
retention of external auditors. Yet, little is known about what actually occurs within audit 
committee meetings since this information is not directly observable for publicly-traded 
companies.1 One audit committee member states “[f]rankly, we don’t do a good job of 
communicating what we do. The public doesn’t see all the work we do, quarter after quarter” 
(NACD 2013). PCAOB Investor Advisory Group committee member Peter H. Nachtwey further 
adds that there are tremendous differences in the level of quality among audit committees, and 
that all committees would benefit by seeing each other’s “best practices” (Nachtwey 2014). Due 
to this lack of transparency, prior researchers are limited to examining various observable 
characteristics of audit committees, such as size, number of meetings, and composition (e.g. Klein 
2002; DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, and Reed 2002; Carcello and Neal 2003). However, 
without observing what audit committee members are actually doing (e.g. with whom they are      
                                                          
1 Even if minutes were made publicly available for publicly-traded companies, these minutes are usually 
thoroughly scrutinized by legal experts and only roughly describe the actions/discussions of the meeting 
(Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 2013). Therefore, minutes for publicly-traded U.S. companies would be 
insufficient to allow for a similar analysis. 
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interacting, what is being discussed, etc.), it is difficult for researchers to conclude what actually 
makes an audit committee effective (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2004). DeFond and 
Zhang (2014) specifically state that: “we know nothing about how audit committees affect pre-
audited financial statement quality, or how they interact with external auditors” (p. 278). 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to take the first step towards providing insight into these 
activities. Specifically, I provide data on audit committee deliberations contained within the 
minutes of university audit committee meetings. Then, I examine whether these audit committee 
deliberations are associated with financial reporting quality.  
Although universities are not publicly-traded firms subject to shareholder demands, universities 
have a fiduciary duty to appropriately manage and oversee the financial resources provided to 
them by the state, taxpayers, and students. Universities also have to compete heavily for scarce 
resources, with universities often issuing debt to supplement reductions in revenue caused by 
declines in both enrollment and public funding (Motley 2014). As a result of these financial 
constraints and demands, many universities are now “being run more and more like for-profit 
enterprises” (Fichtenbaum 2016; p. 1). Unlike publicly-traded firms, though, the minutes of 
university audit committee meetings are often made available on university websites.  For these 
reasons, an examination of university audit committee minutes can help researchers better 
understand audit committees’ monitoring and oversight function and summarize which areas of 
audit committee oversight are useful for other organizations.  
To gather data on deliberations within audit committee meetings, I examine publicly-available 
audit committee minutes from a sample of U.S. universities. This approach is similar to 
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013), which examines minutes to determine the activities of boards 
of directors. I use the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2015 software to process 
discussions contained within the audit committee minutes. LIWC is commonly used in social 
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science research, particularly psychology (McCarthy and Boonthum-Denecke 2012), to analyze 
large volumes of text. In this context, I use the LIWC software to separate the minutes into 14 
categories based on audit committee “best practice” guides issued by the National Association of 
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and public accounting firms.  
My study first provides descriptive statistics about the content of university audit committee 
minutes. Results indicate that the highest percentage of audit committee minutes contain 
discussions with internal audit personnel, followed by discussions concerning financial statement 
review and then, internal controls. Additionally, external audit oversight is discussed in a little 
over half of the committees’ meetings and slightly less than half of their meeting minutes are 
officially approved by the committee during their next meeting, indicating that some committees 
may consider the meetings to be ceremonial. Results also indicate that management oversight is 
discussed the least. 
Second, I examine whether the 14 discussion categories are associated with universities’ financial 
reporting quality, with financial reporting quality proxied by (a lack of) deficiencies in internal 
controls over financial reporting. Internal control deficiencies are used in the governmental sector 
to examine financial reporting quality (Rich and Zhang 2014). In the context of publicly-traded 
firms, internal control deficiencies indicate that it is possible that a misstatement could have 
occurred during that financial period (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 
2004; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Further, prior literature finds that audit committee oversight for 
publicly-traded companies influences the strength of internal control systems, with independent 
audit committees and financial expertise associated with fewer internal control deficiencies 
(Krishnan 2005; Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard 2009). Therefore, using internal control 
deficiencies as a proxy for financial reporting quality allows my findings to generalize to a for-
profit organization setting.  
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Results of backwards elimination analysis indicate that three of the 14 dimensions examined are 
significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of an internal control deficiency. The three 
dimensions are discussions about internal controls, the audit committee charter, and the audit 
committee’s financial expertise. These dimensions are significant even after controlling for audit 
committee meeting frequency (a commonly-used proxy for audit committee oversight). I also find 
that internal control deficiencies are positively associated with university size and the financial 
crisis period. Finally, the likelihood of a deficiency is negatively related to large auditors and 
private sources of funding.   
Of the three discussion categories associated with a decreased likelihood of internal control 
deficiencies, only audit committee expertise information is available for publicly-traded 
companies.2 Even further, companies typically only provide information about the number of 
experts and not information about whether the committee periodically evaluates its financial 
expert. These results suggest that additional topics are associated with improvements in internal 
control quality, yet are not being captured by proxies that are currently available for publicly-
traded companies.  
In additional analyses, I find that discussions regarding the committee’s financial expertise and 
financial statement analysis discussions are negatively associated with the total number of 
internal control deficiencies (which is a proxy for the magnitude of the deficiencies in internal 
control). Discussions regarding non-audit services are positively associated with the total number 
                                                          
2 Although information regarding internal control effectiveness is provided under AS 2201, An Audit of 
Internal Control over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements 
(PCAOB 2007), the Standard applies to accelerated and large accelerated filers. Additionally, the external 
auditor’s report does not include information pertaining to the committee’s oversight over internal controls, 
which is the focus of this study. Additionally, while audit committee charters are made available to the 
public, readers cannot determine the frequency in which committees assess compliance with their charter. 
Even further, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2002) find that what committees should be doing according 
to their charters often differs from what they actually do, suggesting that the charter alone is insufficient to 
assess committee effectiveness. 
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of internal control deficiencies. This suggests that committees assess the need to enlist in 
additional outside assistance as internal control problems become more pervasive. 
This topic and its results are of interest to both researchers and regulators. In contrast to prior 
studies, this study directly examines what transpires during audit committee meetings in order to 
determine which of its activities are most effective, answering calls from Cohen et al. (2004) and 
Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye (2011). It supplements prior studies that examine the association 
between audit committees and financial reporting quality. This paper also highlights the value of 
using a qualitative research methodology, as well as a unique dataset, in order to uncover the 
“underpinnings of the workings of audit committees” (Cohen et al. 2004; p. 96). This study 
complements other qualitative studies, such as Gendron, Bédard, and Gosselin (2004) and 
Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2002), who examine audit committee activities using surveys, 
audit committee charters, and reports. Additionally, academics have an interest in the financial 
reporting health of their specific university as their future with the university is dependent on this 
information. This information is also useful for academics who serve as audit committee/board 
members or consultants who would like to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees.  
This study also provides insights to standard setters and current audit committees. The PCAOB 
Investor Advisory Group has issued calls for audit committees to disclose best practice 
recommendations to other committees. (Nachtwey 2014). Other U.S. governance organizations, 
such as the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) and the SEC, are calling for an increase in 
disclosures related to the activities of the audit committee (Tysiac 2015).  Therefore, this 
information is useful to audit committee members who wish to focus their efforts on activities 
that are most effective. The PCAOB can use this information when evaluating the impact of the 




The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review and 
theory development. Section 3 explains the research method and sample details. Section 4 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 examines the primary results and Section 6 provides 







REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Understanding the Higher Education Industry 
The Size, Scope, and Funding of the Higher Education Industry  
This section provides information about the U.S. higher education industry. The purpose of public 
universities is to provide the opportunity for high-quality education to all students, regardless of 
income level. There are currently almost seven million students enrolled in public four-year 
higher education institutions in the United States, and these universities employ over 1.8 million 
faculty and staff nationwide (National Center for Education Statistics; NCES 2016). At the end of 
the academic year 2013–14, total revenues at all degree-granting postsecondary institutions in the 
U.S. equaled $605 billion (NCES 2016). Revenues of four-year, public universities for fiscal year 
2014 totaled $297 billion. Of that $297 billion, about 36 percent was received from federal, state 
and local government, 21 percent from tuition and fees, 13 percent from the sale of services of 
hospitals, 8 percent from the sales and services of auxiliary enterprises, 7 percent investment 
income, 6 percent from other operating revenues, and the remaining 9 percent from “other,” 
including gifts, capital appropriations, and other non-operating revenues (NCES 2016).  
In most states, state-funded enrollment revenue is determined by a formula that must first be    
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approved by the state legislature. The enrollment revenue formula is based on multiple factors, 
including (university-reported) student headcounts, credit hours, level of instruction, number of 
campuses, and program mix. State revenues are then allocated to individual universities by the 
state department that oversees higher education. Many states are currently facing revenue 
shortfalls, which often result in cuts to higher education funding (Jessell 2013; NASBO 2013). 
Universities must address these differences between revenues and operating expenses by cutting 
expenses or generating funds from other sources, such as debt issuances or tuition and fee 
increases. However, state regulators may restrict the size of any tuition or fee increases. 
Additionally, universities also face significant pressure from students and parents to keep tuition 
levels constant (NASBO 2013).  
University Reporting Requirements 
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is responsible for standard setting for 
governmental institutions (including state universities).3 GASB’s goals in standard setting include 
decision-usefulness and public accountability.  Accountability “implies a willingness to endure 
public scrutiny, even for the public to scrutinize the behaviors of the organization’s leadership” 
(Lawry 1995; 175). The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the standard setting 
body for public and private companies and not-for-profit organizations, states that the objective of 
general purpose financial reporting is “to provide financial information about the reporting entity 
that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding equity 
and debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit” (FASB 2010, 
¶OB2). This is also referred to as the “decision-usefulness” purpose of financial statements.  
                                                          
3 Universities are categorized as public (state-dependent) universities, private, and for-profit universities. 
Audit committee meeting information is only available for public universities, therefore, this university 
category is the focus of this study.  
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According to Coy, Fisher, and Gordon (2001), the decision-usefulness focus is clearly 
documented in GASB’s conceptual framework. Engstrom and Esmond-Kiger (1997) document 
that the financial community (bond rating agencies, investment bankers, underwriters and 
investors) highly depends on universities’ audited financial statements for decision making. For 
example, an analysis of a sample of 100 U.S. college and university annual reports reveals that 
the reports emphasize financial information in order to meet the needs of creditors and lenders 
(Coy et al. 2001; Gordon, Fisher, Malone, and Tower 2002). Bond rating agencies compute a 
number of ratios using both financial and non-financial information, such as the amount of debt 
per student (Gordon and Fisher 2008). 
GASB Statement No. 35 (GASB 35), effective for universities with fiscal years ending after 
2002, contains the reporting requirements for Public Colleges and Universities (GASB 1999). 
This standard changed the financial statements of universities so that they now more closely 
resemble for-profit entities (Fichtenbaum 2016). GASB 35 requires that universities include, in 
their separately issued reports, the following items: management’s discussion and analysis 
(MD&A), financial statements, notes to the financial statements, and required supplementary 
information other than MD&A (GASB 1999). GASB Statement No. 39 provides guidance used to 
determine whether certain organizations should be reported as component units based on the 
nature and significance of their relationship with the primary government (GASB 2002).  
Many universities prepare separate financial statements to accomplish at least one of the 
following objectives: 1) support state or federal aid applications; 2) report financial activities to 
specific groups; and/or 3) prepare financials for use in a bond issuance. Additionally, some states 
choose to issue a separate report for groups of universities referred to as a university system. The 
system is comprised of other campuses, medical centers, and foundations and are reported 
together, because the same group of Regents oversees the entities. The operations of these 
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universities are also included in the state-wide report as a discretely presented component unit in 
the state’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR), which is prepared annually in 
accordance with GASB.  
The CAFR contains audited financial statements that report fiscal activity for the year, as well as 
its year-end statement of financial position. These financial statements are audited by external 
auditors who are either public accounting firms or individuals from the State Auditor’s Office, 
both of whom are required to issue an audit report on the financial statement’s compliance with 
GASB. The filing deadlines for these reports vary by state. 
In addition to financial statement audits, non-federal entities that expend $750,000 (an increase 
from $500,000 effective December 26, 2014) or more of Federal awards in a year are required to 
obtain an annual audit in accordance with the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, OMB 
Circular A-133 (referred to as an A-133 audit or single audit), the OMB Circular Compliance 
Supplement and Government Auditing Standards. Each A-133 audit includes a traditional audit 
conducted by a licensed certified public accountant, an assessment of internal controls, and 
compliance with laws and regulations (OMB 2003, 2013). In addition to federal requirements, 
grant donors often impose a number of rules and restrictions upon the use of grant funds. This 
also typically requires testing performed by internal or external auditors. Audit reports and 
Schedules of Findings and Questioned Costs4 must be submitted annually to the Federal Audit 
Clearinghouse (FAC).5 The FAC makes summary Schedules of Findings and Questioned Costs 
                                                          
4 Questioned costs are expenses that were improperly charged to a grant or program.  Known questioned 
costs in excess of $10,000 (for a major program) are required to be reported by the auditor on the Schedule 
of Findings and Questioned Costs (OMB 2013 §.505).   
5 The FAC database can be accessed using the following link: https://harvester.census.gov/facweb/. 




available to the public for the most recent seven years. Detailed information about findings and 
questioned costs are now available for fiscal years ending on or after 2013.    
As part of the university’s reporting package, the external auditor issues their Report on Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting and on Compliance and Other Matters Based on an Audit of 
the Financial Statements Performed in Accordance with Government Auditing Standards (GAS 
Report). The auditor also issues their Report on Compliance for Each Major Federal Program; 
Report on Internal Control over Compliance; and Report on Schedule of Expenditures of Federal 
Awards as Required by OMC Circular A-133 (A-133 Report; where required). Each report 
contains a Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, which includes a description of 
deficiencies in internal control and compliance, as well as the total dollar amount of total findings 
and questioned costs. These deficiencies are categorized in terms of severity and include control 
deficiencies/other matters, significant deficiencies, and material weaknesses. Significant 
deficiencies (referred to as reportable conditions for years ending prior to 2007) involve 
deficiencies in the design or operation of controls that affect the organization’s financial reporting 
or ability to administer its federal programs. Material weaknesses are significant deficiencies in 
which the design or operation of controls does not reduce to a low level the risk of material 
noncompliance with applicable grant requirements or with GASB generally accepted accounting 
principles that may occur and not be detected in a timely manner (AICPA 2003; Petrovits et al. 
2011).  
In response to the transparency movement of publicly-traded companies, most states have 
implemented transparency initiatives which require universities to make information available to 
the public, such as the audited financial statements described above, revenue and expenditure 
detail, and minutes detailing the meetings of Boards of Regents (and committees). These 
initiatives focus on the transparency needs of the public, which includes parents, students, and 
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taxpayers. The goal is to improve universities’ performance, accountability, information, and 
equity (NASBO 2013). Therefore, although governmental and private entities have separate 
standard-setting bodies, the FASB, GASB, and state standard-setting bodies share a common goal 
of providing information that aids in decision making. 
University Financial Pressures  
All universities are forced to compete for the same scarce resources in terms of students, 
employees, faculty, and funding (Engstrom and Esmond-Kiger 1997). Over time, state 
governments have reduced financial support for universities and encouraged competition and 
financial independence. Additionally, many public universities are losing prospective students to 
private and for-profit universities. As a result, competition for students is increasing as public 
universities are losing market share (NASBO 2013). This loss in funding can have a devastating 
effect on universities. A significant loss in funding for any university reduces the funding that is 
available for general operations, affects the university’s ability to attract and retain quality 
research faculty, and impacts the university’s ability to maintain a high academic and research 
reputation (Jessell 2013).  
To compensate for reduced government support, universities are turning to the financial 
community. This outside financial support is used to pay for projects, such as the refurbishment 
and building of classroom space, residence halls, and parking garages. However, universities are 
beginning to feel the stress of their increased debt loads (Jessell 2013). This means that 
universities are acting more like for-profit business entities with an obligation to increase 
operational efficiency and effectiveness (Schmidt and Günther 2016).  
Schmidt and Günther (2016) highlight the potential risks associated with universities’ increased 
autonomy from state funding and accountability to outside debt holders. The authors state that it 
is “surprising that risk issues have not been discussed so far in light of the fact that some (private) 
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universities, especially in Anglo-American countries, have had to file for bankruptcy or run into 
severe problems of financial distress. […] Thus, risks in the higher education sector and overall 
risk management appear to be under-researched” (Schmidt and Günther 2016; p. 27). Even 
further, universities are not subject to external monitoring provided by groups such as 
institutional shareholders (as in the publicly-traded company setting). Therefore, university audit 
committees may need to compensate with increased levels of monitoring.  
Earnings Management in the Higher Education Industry 
Healy and Whalen (1999; p. 368) define earnings management as “manage[ment’s] use [of] 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” Many times, 
managers are compensated both directly (through salaries and bonuses) or indirectly (through 
prestige, future promotions, and job security) depending on the firm’s earnings performance, 
which is generally based on an earnings benchmark. However, management has discretion over 
reported earnings. This discretion, combined with the effects of earnings on management’s 
compensation, leads to agency problems (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Although management compensation structures at not-for-profit and governmental entities are 
different from their counterparts at for-profit entities, Leone and Van Horn (2005) provide 
evidence that earnings management occurs in the governmental sector as well. Specifically, the 
authors find evidence that nonprofits adjust earnings just above zero. The reason is that these 
organizations have incentives not only to avoid losses but also to avoid reporting large positive 
net income (for fear of losing their nonprofit status). In a working paper, Kuroki (2015) 
documents that this incentive exists for Japanese colleges and universities as well, finding that 
managers manage earnings toward zero in these institutions. Although Kuroki (2015) examines 
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private universities, Japanese universities are funded in a similar fashion to U.S. public colleges 
and universities and are accountable to the same group of stakeholders.  
Kuroki (2015) documents that the primary motivation for university leaders to manage earnings 
near zero is to prevent bad publicity associated with poor financial performance. This fear is also 
shared by U.S. university management where a reduction in state funding has been referred to as 
“a killer in higher education” (Flaherty 2017). The inability to recruit strong faculty affects 
university enrollment and many other aspects of the university. Therefore, universities have 
strong incentives to portray a positive message about their ability to continue to provide high-
quality, affordable education as evidenced by positive cash flows and changes in net position (net 
income).  
Additionally, as stated previously, competition for public funding is intense, and this intensity 
increases as the pool of available state funding declines (Jessell 2013; NASBO 2013). Since 
many states are implementing performance-based or outcomes-based budgeting models in order 
to determine which institutions receive state funding, the level of funding received by universities 
is becoming increasingly dependent on university-reported information. However, Coy et al. 
(2001) highlight that in addition to the risk of earnings management, there is an incentive for 
management to misreport non-financial information as well. Specifically, they state that 
performance information is often inaccurate. The UK University Funding Council 1989 
documented that “it has become apparent that the assumption of honesty and veracity was not 
always justified and in one or two subject areas, at least, it would seem that deliberate 
’misreporting’ occurred” (Cave, Hanney, Henkel, and Kogan 1997; p. 127). 
Demand for Audit Committees to Serve as Monitors in the University Setting 
Prior literature demonstrates that independent outside directors protect shareholders in the 
presence of an agency problem (e.g. Brickley and James 1987). Boards are responsible for 
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monitoring management in order to protect stakeholders’ interests. The governing boards of 
colleges and universities are referred to as a Board of Regents (also the Board of Trustees, 
Governors, or Visitors). University boards are almost exclusively comprised of outside directors 
that are externally appointed by the state or elected by the existing board members (Gordon et al. 
2002).  
Most of the board’s functions are delegated to individual committees within the board, such as the 
audit committee (Laux and Laux 2009). The audit committee is responsible for monitoring the 
integrity of the firm’s financial statements, overseeing the internal audit function, and 
corresponding with the external auditors. Therefore, the firm’s level of earnings management is 
influenced by the audit committee’s level of monitoring (Klein 2002; Laux and Laux 2009).   
Audit Committee Literature and Research Questions  
Prior research on audit committees for publicly-traded companies has typically focused on 
observable characteristics of the committee. Specifically, prior studies have focused on audit 
committee size, independence, meeting frequency, and financial/industry expertise. Researchers 
have found that financial reporting quality is positively associated with audit committee meeting 
frequency (Menon and Williams 1994) and audit committee independence (Abbott, Parker, and 
Peters 2004). More independent audit committees also enhance audit quality by protecting audit 
firms from dismissals following the issuance of going-concern reports (Carcello and Neal 2003). 
Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) find that earnings management is negatively associated 
with audit committee financial expertise. Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou (2007) document that firms 
with internal control weaknesses have fewer financial experts. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
extend this literature and find that only accounting and financial expertise are associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. Baura, Rama, and Sharma (2010) document a substitution 
effect between audit committee expertise and the firm’s investment in internal auditing. 
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Specifically, the firm’s investment in internal auditing is negatively related to the audit committee 
financial expertise and audit committee tenure. As summarized by Carcello et al. (2011), “good” 
audit committees are associated with “good” outcomes, where good audit committees are defined 
as those that are independent and experts, and good outcomes consist of less earnings 
management/fraud, effective internal controls and higher audit quality.  
In the governmental sector, Rezaee, Elmore, and Szendi (2000) examine the functions of audit 
committees in corporations and compare them to those of colleges and universities. They find that 
audit committees for colleges and universities are smaller, but the relationships with the 
committees and both internal and external auditors are similar. Additionally, they find that the 
specification of duties is “virtually identical” and involves overseeing organizational governance, 
the financial reporting process, and the internal and external auditors (Rezaee et al. 2000). Within 
governmental literature, universities have become the focus of corporate governance studies since 
they represent multi-million dollar enterprises (e.g. De Silva Lokuwaduge and Armstrong 2015; 
Dixon and Coy 2007). For example, De Silva Lokuwaduge and Armstrong (2015) examine the 
impact of board committees for Australian universities and find that stronger committees are 
positively associated with university financial performance (viability and sustainability).   
However, despite the vast amount of research about the characteristics of audit committees, little 
is known about what audit committees actually do. Carcello et al. (2002) find that the actual 
reported activities of audit committee members differs from their expected activities according to 
their charter, even further highlighting the need to study the actual actions of the audit committee 
members. In their call for research, DeFond and Zhang (2014) specifically state that: “we know 
nothing about how audit committees affect pre-audited financial statement quality, or how they 
interact with external auditors” (p. 278). Therefore, the purpose of this study is to take the first 
step towards providing insight into these activities. Because this study is exploratory, I present 
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generalized research questions instead of formal hypotheses (following Burrows and Black 1998; 
Groot and Merchant 2000; Fleischman and Stephenson 2012; Wright 1983). This leads to the 
following research questions: 
(RQ1) What are the topics of deliberation during audit committee meetings?  
(RQ2) Which of these topics are associated with financial reporting quality? 
Since financial reporting quality is difficult to measure, I examine financial reporting quality in 
terms of internal control deficiencies, where (a lack of) financial reporting quality is measured 
using the presence of internal control deficiencies. I focus on internal control deficiencies for a 
few reasons. First, internal control deficiencies are commonly used in the governmental sector as 
a proxy for financial reporting quality (Rich and Zhang 2014; Petrovits et al. 2011). While the 
identification of an internal control deficiency is not always directly associated with a financial 
reporting misstatement, internal control deficiencies indicate that it is possible that a financial 
reporting misstatement could have occurred (PCAOB 2004; DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
Depending on the severity of the deficiency, this misstatement would be considered material. As 
such, I analyze the presence of severe deficiencies, which in this study are significant deficiencies 
and material weaknesses.  
Second, internal control deficiencies are commonly examined in publicly-traded company 
research as a proxy for financial reporting quality (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and 
LaFond 2008; Bedard and Graham 2011; Naiker and Sharma 2009). Therefore, my findings can 
more easily translate to this setting (compared to other higher education industry-specific 
measures). Finally, other commonly used measures, such as accruals quality and restatements, do 
not easily translate into the higher education setting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Baber, Gore, 









Due to the large volume (content and number) of audit committee minutes for U.S. universities, I 
use the LIWC 2015 software to categorize the content of the audit committee minutes. This 
software allows users to define a set of categories in which to analyze a document based on a 
user-defined data dictionary and has been widely used in the social sciences (McCarthy and 
Boonthum-Denecke 2012). The LIWC software scans each set of audit committee minutes for 
matching key phrases (outlined in the data dictionary) and outputs the total document percentage 
of words that pertain to each category. Appendix A includes a description of each category that I 
use to analyze the audit committee minutes.  
The categories are based on recommendations from guidance issued by public accounting firms 
and from NACUBO.  NACUBO is a membership organization that is comprised of chief business 
and financial officers from more than 2,100 colleges and universities. The association’s mission 
is to provide guidance and other assistance to universities in order to promote efficient business 
and finance strategies and is a reference source used by universities. In 2003, NACUBO released 
an advisory report as a guide for universities in implementing SOX (Congress 2002).  Although 
SOX does not directly apply to universities, NACUBO considers the concerns that SOX covers to   
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be universal. As such, within their report, NACUBO provides recommendations for addressing 
issues raised by SOX. The report includes a checklist addressing each item of SOX and its 
corresponding item as it relates to universities. I use this checklist to define audit committee 
categories as described below (NACUBO 2003). I also define categories based on suggestions 
from EY’s Guide for Audit Committees (Ernst & Young 2014), which provides areas of focus to 
help audit committee members perform their oversight function.  
The first set of categories that I define are those that involve the university’s internal controls and 
risk assessment, as well as their impact on the financial statements. The audit committee has the 
responsibility to oversee internal controls which involves understanding key controls, the internal 
auditor’s testing of controls, and the implementation of corrective action (1_INTERNAL 
CONTROLS). The audit committee should also understand fraud risks (2_FRAUD RISK), which 
include the risk of management override of controls and fraud as it relates to revenue recognition. 
The committee should also obtain an understanding of the overall business and legal risks 
affecting the university (3_ASSESS RISK; Ernst & Young 2014). NACUBO (2003) further 
emphasizes the importance of the organization’s overall “tone at the top.” As a result, the 
checklist recommends that the financial officers adopt a code of conduct. The audit committee 
should periodically review this code of conduct to determine the code’s adequacy and how 
management assures compliance with this code (4_CODE OF CONDUCT). The committee is 
also responsible for overseeing management (5_MGT OVERSIGHT). Management is responsible 
for the university’s internal controls and information contained in financial statements. The audit 
committee should meet with management to discuss critical and significant accounting practices 
and policies, significant estimates and misstatements, or internal control issues (NACUBO 2003).   
The second set of categories involve audit committee organization and operation derived from 
EY’s Guide for Audit Committees (Ernst & Young 2014) and NACUBO’s SOX Checklist for 
20 
 
Higher Education (NACUBO 2003), as well as the NASDAQ and NYSE audit committee 
requirements for registrants (NYSE 2013; SEC 2008). 6_AC CHARTER identifies audit 
committee discussions regarding the implementation (and later revisions) of the audit committee 
charter. Prior literature has demonstrated that financial expertise affects audit committee 
oversight (Abbott et al. 2004). Therefore, I also examine whether the committee performs a self-
assessment to determine if it has sufficient financial expertise among committee members 
(7_EXPERT). I also examine whether the audit committee formally approves the audit committee 
minutes (8_APPROVE MEETING). The last audit committee organization item that I measure is 
whether the audit committee holds private sessions with internal audit, management, or external 
auditors (9_EXEC SESSION). These sessions provide committees with the opportunity to set 
clear expectations for each of these groups (Ernst & Young 2014).  
The third set of categories outline the audit committee’s role in overseeing the audit process. 
Since auditor oversight is a key role of the audit committee, I examine whether the committee 
documents their discussions with the independent auditor (10_ADT OVERSIGHT). NACUBO 
also recommends that the audit committee pre-approves all non-audit services to be performed by 
the external auditor (NACUBO 2013). Therefore, I examine whether the minutes contain 
discussions of the audit committee’s approval of non-audit services (11_NAS). Finally, both 
NACUBO (2003) and the EY guide (Ernst & Young 2014) recommend that the audit committee 
review internal audit’s plan, receive periodic updates from the internal audit department regarding 
internal control findings and obtain information regarding implementation status of remedies. As 
such, I indicate whether the audit committee meets with internal audit personnel (12_IAUD). 
My final two categories focus on the financial statements as a whole. Stakeholders rely on audit 
committees to ensure that financial statements are prepared in conformity with GASB generally 
accepted accounting principles and are free from material error. Due to the audit committee’s role 
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in the financial statement oversight process, I include a financial statement category (13_FIN 
STATEMENTS) to capture these related discussions. These topics include the usage of accruals 
and estimates, critical accounting policies, and the discussion of the implementation of GASB 
standards (Ernst & Young 2014). Finally, since revenue allocations are often based on enrollment 
numbers or other financial ratios, I include a category that captures discussions surrounding 
performance measures (14_FIN STRENGTH).  
For each of the categories described, the LIWC output provides the percentage of words (of the 
document total) related to that category. Since my primary interest is whether the topic was 
discussed or not, I convert these scores into indicator variables that equal one if the LIWC score 
is greater than zero; zero otherwise. Additionally, I obtain all audit committee minutes, by 
university, that relate to a particular year. Therefore, I sum the number of times that each item 
was discussed, by year. I divide that total by the total number of meetings so I do not artificially 
inflate the totals for universities that meet more frequently during the year. My score for each 
category then reflects the percentage of meetings in which each topic was discussed (by year) as 
indicated by the “PCT” included at the end of each category title.  
Primary Model 
With internal control deficiencies as my proxy for financial reporting quality, I estimate the 
following overall model:  
FS WEAKit=  β0 + β1SIZE it + β2LINVESTit + β3TLTAit + β4ROTAit + β5SWITCHit + β6 BIG Nit  
+ β7NUMBER OF MEETINGSit  + β8SOXit + β9CRISISit + β10DOCTORALit  
+ β11PUBLIC PCTit + β12PRIVATE PCTit + β13SA WEAKit 
+ β141_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCTit + β152_FRAUD RISK PCTit   
+ β16 3_ASSESS RISK PCTit  + β174_CODE OF CONDUCT PCTit  
+ β185_MGT OVERSIGHT PCTit + β196_AC CHARTER PCTit  
+ β207_EXPERT PCTit + β218_APPROVE MEETING PCTit   
+ β229_EXEC SESSION PCTit + β2310_ADT OVERSIGHT PCTit  
+ β2411_NAS PCTit  + β2512_IAUD PCTit + β2613_FIN STATEMENTS PCTit  




where subscripts i and t indicate university and year, respectively. I estimate Model (1) using a 
logistic regression where FS WEAK is equal to one if the university reported a significant 
deficiency or material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting during the period; 
zero otherwise.6,7   
Along with the audit committee deliberation categories discussed previously, the model includes 
several controls for university and financial reporting characteristics. Following Mellett, Peel, and 
Karbhari (2007), I control for university size (SIZE) based on the natural log of total revenues.8 
More complex auditees have a higher risk of misstatement or poor financial reporting quality 
(Krishnan et al. 2011). Therefore, I control for complexity based on the amount of the 
university’s financial investments. Specifically, I measure the accounting complexity of financial 
investments (LINVEST) by taking the log of the year-end value of financial investments (Mellett 
et al. 2007). I also include an indicator variable that measures differences attributable to the 
Carnegie Classifications of universities.9  Specifically, DOCTORAL equals one for universities 
classified as Doctoral/Research Universities; zero otherwise.   
                                                          
6 I follow Petrovits, Shakespeare, and Shih (2011) who examine internal control deficiencies in nonprofit 
organizations and measure my dependent variable as a binary indicator variable. I include consideration of 
both material weaknesses and significant deficiencies because the presence of an issue at either indicates that 
the nonprofit organization is not effectively carrying out its fiduciary responsibilities (Petrovits et al. 2011). 
Further, Petrovits et al. (2011) document that the presence of either level of internal control problem 
negatively impact donations and government support received in future periods.  
7 In an untabulated analysis, I also follow Rich and Zhang (2014) and measure my dependent variable using 
an ordered logit model (where the presence of a significant deficiency is an indicator variable equal to one, 
a material weakness equal to two; zero otherwise) and obtain quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
results. 
8 Some of the universities in my sample represent state-wide systems with multiple universities under one 
governing body. The model controls for this using the size and complexity measures, with state-wide 
systems representing the larger, more complex universities in my sample. An alternative means to control 
for this is to include an indicator variable in the model for state-wide systems, but due to multi-collinearity 
concerns between the state-wide indicator variable and my SIZE measure, these measures cannot be in the 
model at the same time. Results are similar if I replace SIZE with a state-wide indicator variable. 
9 Carnegie Classifications categorize schools using the highest degrees offered by the university and the 
school’s relative research intensity (compared to similar schools). The categories group relatively 
homogenous groups of universities together with respect to the functions of the institutions as well as the 
characteristics of students and members of the faculty (McCormick and Zhao 2005). Classifications can be 
found online: http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/. 
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I control for client specific-risk and financial performance, as both are associated with audit 
quality in for-profit entities (Newton et al. 2013). Universities with greater financial liabilities, as 
compared to total assets, are under greater financial and performance risk (Mellett et al. 2007). 
Therefore, my first measure of risk (TLTA) is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
My second measure of risk (ROTA) is calculated as the total change in net position (net income) 
scaled by total assets (Mellett et al. 2007). Finally, since the source of funding is associated with 
the quality of governance in the nonprofit sector (Harris et al. 2015), I include two variables that 
measure the percentage of the total university’s resources from public and private sources. 
Specifically, I control for the percentage of total revenues received from federal, state, and local 
government (PUBLIC_PCT). My second measure, PRIVATE_PCT, measures the percentage of 
total university revenues received from private donors.10 Finally, I control for deficiencies in 
internal control over compliance, as these problems may reveal underlying issues with the 
university.11 SA WEAK is an indicator variable equal to one if the university reported a severe 
deficiency in internal controls over compliance (significant deficiency or material weakness); 
zero otherwise. 
I also control for characteristics of the university’s audit firm. I include an indicator variable for 
Big 4 audit firms (BIG N) that is equal to one if the client is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t; 
zero otherwise.12 Regulators document that auditor changes improve reporting quality by 
increasing the auditor’s objectivity and decreasing fee dependence (GAO 2003). However, prior 
research suggests that audit quality is lower in the first few years of the audit due to fee pressure 
                                                          
10 The university revenue sources not reflected in these two measures include tuition and fees, sales of 
services of hospitals, investment income, and services of auxiliary enterprises. 
11 I also include a lagged variable that equals one if the university had a prior year significant deficiency or 
material weakness; zero otherwise, as this could also indicate systemic problems with the university. I find 
that of my discussion variables, IC_PCT is no longer significantly positive (p=0.108; untabulated), and 
EXEC_SESS_PCT becomes significantly positive (p=0.004; untabulated).  
12 I obtain similar results if I replace with an indicator variable equal to one for external (non-State/Internal) 
auditors; 0 otherwise. 
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or lack of client-related knowledge (e.g. Stanley and DeZoort 2007). Therefore, I control for 
changes in auditors (SWITCH) using an indicator variable equal to one if the client switched 
auditors during year t; zero otherwise.  
I control for the number of meetings (NUMBER OF MEETINGS) held by the audit committee 
during the year because results in Menon and Williams (1994) indicate that audit committee 
meeting frequency is associated with financial reporting quality. Additionally, I include two time 
period indicator variables to capture variation in the likelihood of internal control problems 
affecting firms caused by external forces. The first of which, SOX, is an indicator variable that 
equals one for university-year observations in the post-SOX time period (after 2002); zero 
otherwise. Studies document an increased focus on entities’ control environments in the post-
SOX period (Coates and Srinivasan 2014). Finally, Ettredge, Fuerherm, and Li (2014) document 
evidence of an increased likelihood of internal control weaknesses during the 2008 recession. 
Therefore, I include a second measure, CRISIS, which is an indicator variable equal to one for 
university-year observations during 2008 and 2009; zero otherwise.13 All variables are measured 
in year t.14 Standard errors are clustered by year and university in my primary analysis.  
I first estimate Model (1) using all independent variables identified above. However, each 
variable may not affect financial reporting quality in the university setting. Additionally, some of 
the discussion variables may proxy for similar dimensions of audit committee oversight. 
Therefore, I follow prior studies and use backward elimination to reduce the total number of 
variables in the model (Carcello et al. 2002; Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2011; Xu and Zhang 
                                                          
13 The results for my primary analysis remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar if I include years 1999 
and 2001 in the CRISIS period (untabulated). 
14 I also estimate Model (1) using a lagged variable approach, where FS WEAK is measured in year t-1. Of 
my total audit committee discussion variables, only AC_CHARTER_PCT has a significant association with 
the likelihood of a severe deficiency. This suggests that audit committee discussions drive changes in 
financial reporting quality instead of findings driving the audit committee discussions (reverse causality).  
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2009).15 In my backward elimination estimation, variables are retained in the model if they are 
significant at the 20 percent level. In backward elimination, the results of the Wald test for 
individual parameters are examined. The least significant effect that does not meet the 
significance level of 20 percent is removed from the model. This process is repeated until no 
other effect meets the level for removal (Bursac, Gauss, Williams, and Hosmer 2008). I retain 
significant variables obtained using backward elimination and re-estimate Model (1) using those 
variables.  
Sample Selection 
To obtain my sample of university audit committee minutes, I first identify all public four-year 
universities (excluding universities that provide predominantly associates degrees) within the U.S 
from the NCES database (NCES 2016). This initial search produced a listing of 404 state-
dependent universities, of which, 160 are classified as research universities16. From this listing, I 
searched the university’s website to determine whether the university’s audit committee minutes 
are publicly available. Of these 160 research universities, 79 universities only provide minutes for 
the entire Board of Trustees/Regents.17 An additional four universities do not have a separate 
                                                          
15 Note that I use backward elimination instead of principal component analysis (PCA) because PCA is used 
to reduce the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large number of interrelated variables (while 
retaining as much of the variation in the data set as possible). PCA transforms to a new set of variables 
(principal components) and creates new, uncorrelated variables (components). The first few components 
retain most of the variation present in all of the original variables. (Jolliffe 2002). An examination of a 
correlation matrix of the 14 audit committee variables suggests that high collinearity among the 14 variables 
is not a significant problem (all estimated correlation coefficients are < 0.48; 1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT 
and 10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT). The largest estimated variance inflation factor is 2.002 (7_EXPERT_PCT). 
Further, when I estimate the significant principal components, only the first principal component is greater 
than unity. That component retains 11 of the 14 original audit committee variables, and thus does not 
significantly reduce the total number of original variables from the estimated model.  
16 Value for the carnegie_sector variable = 1 for Public Research universities. I limit my initial search to 
research-oriented universities as these universities are the most likely to have a separate audit committee 
(as well as publish minutes online). I obtain additional coverage over non-research universities because 
over 25% of my sample is comprised of university systems (multiple universities that share one governing 
body), which also include non-research universities. See Appendix B for the university listing for this 
sample. 
17 Although the majority of states have implemented a transparency initiative requiring information such as 
audit committee minutes be made available to the public, the determination to provide audit committee 
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audit committee, and one university does not provide copies of any Board or committee meetings 
online. Of the 76 universities with minutes available online, I obtain all audit committee minutes 
that are available for a total of 1,632 minutes related to 389 university-year observations.18 The 
earliest minutes available are related to fiscal years ending June 30, 1996. The most recent 
minutes available are related to fiscal years ending June 30, 2017. 
I manually assigned the minutes to a fiscal year based on the date of the audit committee minutes. 
Minutes occurring during the fiscal year are assigned to that fiscal year-end.19 Based on these 
dates, I obtain financial information from the university’s financial statements published on the 
university’s website. The majority of these universities also publish copies of the A-133 report on 
their website. Therefore, I extract information about total deficiencies from these reports. For 
universities in which the A-133 report is not available, I obtain this information from the FAC 
database. I was unable to locate the financial statements for 26 university-year observations. 
Additionally, I was unable to locate the A-133 reports for 33 university-year observations. My 
final sample is comprised of 330 university-year observations between June 30, 1996, and June 
30, 2016. A summary of the sample selection process is provided in Table 1, Panel A.
                                                          
minutes online is typically made by the Board. Other universities disclose that copies of the minutes are 
available upon request. Because one of the purposes of this study is to demonstrate the availability of such 
data, I restrict my sample to universities that publish their minutes online. This restriction may limit the 
generalizability of my results to the full population of universities. However, in an untabulated analysis, when 
I compare my sample to the entire population of research universities from 2000-2012 (data available at 
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/deltacostproject/), the total mean (net) tuition revenue for my sample is not 
significantly different from the remaining population of state-dependent universities (p-value=0.267). This 
provides some evidence that my sample does not significantly differ from the universe of all state-dependent 
research universities. 
18 Appendix B identifies 45 universities and university systems. My sample is comprised of 12 university 
systems (overseeing 43 universities), and 33 individual universities. 
19 In order to determine whether the timing of discussions impacts internal control deficiencies, I perform a 
supplemental analysis where I separately examine discussions that only occurred during Quarter 4 (for the 
same fiscal year). I also analyze discussions that occurred during the first quarter of the next fiscal year 








Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Focus Areas of Audit Committee Meetings (RQ1) 
Table 1, Panel B, presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample of audit committee minutes. 
On average, university audit committee members meet a little over four times per year. Total 
revenues (SIZE) and total investments (LINVEST) and are reported as natural logs.  The log 
transformed values of revenues (SIZE) are larger than publicly-traded firms, with a mean equal to 
21.281. The log of the transformed values of total investments (LINVEST) are 0.241, which are 
slightly larger than publicly-traded firms.20 BIG_N auditors have a smaller market share of this 
population when compared to publicly-traded companies (around 21 percent). On average, if the 
university reported an internal control deficiency, it reported a total of over three severe (either a 
significant deficiency or material weakness) internal control deficiencies (COUNT FS WEAK; 
3.610). Additionally, 35.8 percent of university-year observations included financial reporting 
deficiencies that were severe (FS WEAK) and 50.6 percent reported deficiencies in internal 
                                                          
20 In comparison with the general Compustat population, the mean total revenues in my sample is $3.5 
billion compared to $2.8 billion for the general Compustat population (untabulated). The mean total 




controls over compliance (SA WEAK). Approximately 42.8 percent of total revenues are received 
from public funding sources (PUBLIC_PCT) and 9.7 percent from private sources 
(PRIVATE_PCT). 
With regards to the audit committee deliberation topics, the most frequently discussed items are 
meetings with internal audit (12_IAUD PCT; 70.9 percent). The second most discussed topic 
involves approval of the financial statements (13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT; 67.0 percent of 
university-year observations), followed by internal controls discussions (1_INTERNAL 
CONTROLS PCT), which were addressed in over 61.5 percent of their university-years. Members 
approved a little less than half of the minutes of their meetings (8_APPROVE MEETING PCT; 
49.8 percent). Audit committees also frequently discussed their role in overseeing the external 
auditors (10_ADT OVERIGHT PCT; 53.9 percent). Other significant discussions included risk 
assessment (3_ASSESS RISK PCT; 49.5 percent), the risk of fraud (2_FRAUD RISK PCT; 31.7 
percent) and their charter (6_AC CHARTER PCT; 20.2 percent). Audit committees did not 
frequently discuss their role in overseeing management (5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT), codes of 
conduct (4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT), non-audit services (11_NAS PCT), or identify the 
expert members of the committee (7_EXPERT PCT) as less than ten percent of meetings included 
discussions of these topics.   
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are 
presented below (above) the diagonal line. All correlations that are bold are significant at the five 
percent level. Of my 14 discussion categories, eight are significantly negatively correlated with 
the likelihood of a control deficiency.  Specifically, 1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT, 2_FRAUD 
RISK PCT, 3_ASSESS RISK PCT, 4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT, 5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT, 
6_AC CHARTER PCT, 7_EXPERT PCT, and 13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT are significantly 
negatively correlated with FS WEAK. Additionally, NUMBER OF MEETINGS, which is often 
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used in prior studies as a measure of audit committee effectiveness, is positively correlated with 
FS WEAK. This provides an initial univariate response to my second research question in regards 
to what committee discussions are related to financial reporting quality. It also highlights the 
importance of actually examining what audit committees are discussing, in addition to their 
meeting frequency, when examining audit committee effectiveness.  
The control variables’ correlations also appear to be reasonable. Specifically, university SIZE and 
DOCTORAL institutions, which capture university reporting complexity, are positively correlated 
with FS WEAK. Risk, as measured as the ratio of liabilities to assets (TLTA), and post-SOX 
periods (SOX), are negatively correlated with FS WEAK. This indicates that management, internal 
auditors, and audit committees are appropriately addressing risk at their universities. Finally, 
deficiencies in controls over financial reporting (FS WEAK) are positively correlated with 
deficiencies in controls over compliance (SA WEAK). These findings provide support for 










Impact of Discussions on Financial Reporting Quality (RQ2) 
Table 3, Panel A, presents the results from estimating the full version of Model (1) using logistic 
regression. The dependent variable in this table is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
university reported a severe deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting (significant 
deficiency or material weakness); zero otherwise (FS WEAK). 
With regards to the audit committee deliberation variables, the likelihood of a severe deficiency 
marginally decreases when the committee discusses whether it has a financial expert on the 
committee (7_EXPERT_PCT; -2.921; p-value=0.074). The likelihood of a severe deficiency is 
also marginally negatively associated with the committee’s discussion of its roles and 
responsibilities as outlined in its charter (6_AC CHARTER PCT; -1.360; p-value=0.053). 
For the control variables within the full model, I find that the likelihood of a severe deficiency 
increases with larger (SIZE) firms (0.554; p-value=0.012) and decreases with higher values of 
ROTA (-3.932; p-value=0.028). Firms have an increased likelihood of an internal control 
deficiency during the financial crisis period (CRISIS; 1.047; p-value=0.027), consistent with 
Ettredge et al. (2014). The source of funding also has an impact on financial reporting quality. 
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Specifically, I find that private sources of funding (PRIVATE_PCT) are marginally negatively 
associated (-3.778; p-value=0.090) with the likelihood of a severe deficiency. Additionally, 
universities that have deficiencies in internal controls over compliance are more likely to have a 
severe deficiency in controls over financial reporting (SA WEAK; 1.733; p-value<0.001). 
Table 3, Panel B, presents the results of estimating Model (1) using backward elimination. I find 
similar results when estimating the model with fewer variables. Discussions regarding the 
committee’s charter increases in significance (6_AC CHARTER PCT; -1.608; p-value=0.011). 
Universities with committees that identify and assess their financial expert (7_EXPERT PCT) 
have a marginally negative association with the likelihood of a deficiency (-2.957; p-
value=0.094). Alternatively, discussions regarding the overall financial health of the university 
(14_FIN STRENGTH) are marginally positively associated with deficiencies in internal control 
(1.315; p-value=0.063). However, I now find that auditor size (BIG N) is significantly negatively 
associated with the likelihood of a severe deficiency (-0.989; p-value=0.017). I also document a 
significantly negative association between committees that discuss internal controls 
(1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT; -0.913; p-value=0.048) and severe deficiencies.  
These results indicate that university-years that include a discussion of internal controls, the odds 
of reporting a severe deficiency is about 40.1 percent of the odds of a university-years with no 
such discussion.21 Additionally, for university-years that include a discussion of their charter and 
financial experts, the odds of reporting a severe deficiency is about 20.0 percent and 5.2 percent, 
respectively, of the odds of a university-years with no such discussion. University-years that 
include a discussion regarding the financial health of the university (14_FIN STRENGTH) are 
nearly four times as likely to report a deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting 
(372.5 percent), compared to years without such discussion. In terms of economic significance, I 
                                                          
21 Estimates of log-odds are computed as exp(coefficient estimate). 
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rely on the auditor’s classification of deficiencies and assume that the presence of a severe 
deficiency would have a material impact on the financial statements.   
As a further test of the significance of the audit committee discussion variables to the model, I 
examine changes in the model’s ROC curve with and without the audit committee discussion 
variables to determine whether audit committee discussions affect financial reporting quality 
(above what is captured by university attributes alone). First, I estimate Model (1) without the 
discussion variables (untabulated) and find that the area under the ROC curve for this model 
equals 0.804. Second, I compare this value to the area under the ROC curve for the full model 
results shown in Table 3, Panel A, which is equal to 0.840. Using the PROC CONTRAST 
statement in SAS, my analysis indicates that the difference between the area under the ROC 
curves is significant (p-value<0.01). Results of the same analysis using the backward elimination 
models (Table 3, Panel B) provide similar results (p-value=0.030). 
In summary, I find that audit committees most often meet with and discuss the findings of 
internal audit. The next most frequently discussed items are financial statements, internal 
controls, and the committee’s role in overseeing the external auditor. However, of these four top 
discussions, only discussions regarding internal controls are negatively associated with internal 
control deficiencies, which indicates that the remaining items frequently discussed by committees 
do not have a direct impact on university internal control quality. University characteristics such 
as changes in net assets, private funding, and Big N auditors are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of a severe deficiency. This suggests that private donors and large auditors serve as 
monitors, resulting in improvements in financial reporting quality. University size (log of total 
revenues) is positively associated with deficiencies, signaling that universities have internal 
control problems related to revenue reporting. Universities also reported a higher likelihood of 
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internal control deficiencies during the financial crisis, which indicates that universities moved 









My primary analysis examines the likelihood of a severe internal control deficiency. In order to 
examine the severity of the internal control problems at the university, I re-estimate Model (1) by 
replacing the dependent variable with the sum of the total number of significant deficiencies and 
material weaknesses for that year (COUNT FS WEAK). I remove observations without a control 
deficiency and estimate Model (1) using a negative binomial regression.22 Therefore, the 
estimated coefficients represent the association between the university, auditor, and audit 
committee characteristics and the total number of internal control problems identified at the 
university.  
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Model (1) with COUNT FS WEAK as the dependent 
variable.  For brevity, I only include the results after estimating backward elimination in Table 4. 
Consistent with Table 3, SIZE is significantly positively associated with total internal control 
findings (p-value=0.017). The sources of funding continue to play an important role in internal
                                                          
22 Because COUNT FS WEAK is a count variable in this model, I recognize that a Poisson regression 
modeling approach could be appropriate, as well. However, I find that over-dispersion is present with my 
model (untabulated), necessitating the use of a negative binomial regression model in this particular setting. 
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control quality, with public sources of funding negatively associated with the total number of 
deficiencies (PUBLIC_PCT; p-value<0.001), This suggests that a large number of deficiencies 
indicates problems with the university, resulting in a loss of public funding. Large auditors may 
identify more problems with the university, as indicated by the significantly positive association 
between BIG N auditors and the number of deficiencies (p-value<0.001). 
Of the audit committee discussions, three items are associated with total findings. The first topic 
of discussion, non-audit fees (11_NAS PCT), is significantly positively associated with internal 
control deficiencies (p-value=0.017). This positive association suggests that audit committee 
members address problems at the university by contracting with consultants or other outside 
advisors. The identification and evaluation of the committee’s financial expert is associated with 
improvements in financial reporting quality, as indicated by the negative coefficient on 
7_EXPERT PCT (p-value=0.005). Finally, discussions about the university’s financial statements 
are negatively associated with total deficiencies (13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT; p-value=0.005). 
This suggests that audit discussions regarding the financial statements translate into 
improvements in financial reporting quality.  
In summary, when examining the total number of deficiencies (another indicator of the severity 
of the internal control problem), I find that discussions about non-audit fees, financial statements, 
and the audit committee financial expert are associated with the total number of severe internal 
control problems. Of the discussion topics associated with the total number of deficiencies, only 
financial statements discussions are amongst the three most frequently discussed topics. This 
suggests that committees play an active role in addressing internal control problems, however, 
their areas of focus do not always translate in to improvements in financial reporting quality. 
Quarter Four Discussions 
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The timing of audit committee discussions may have different impacts on internal control 
findings. For example, external auditors are typically on-site performing interim audit procedures 
during the fourth quarter. Audit committees may increase their discussions amongst the 
committee and management in attempts to rectify problems before year-end. Alternatively, 
increases in certain discussion areas may lead to fewer problems identified for that year-end.  
Therefore, I re-estimate Model (1) where discussion variables are measured using only minutes of 
meetings that occurred during the fourth quarter. All control variables are measured in year t. 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating Model (1) for fourth quarter discussions. Panel A 
presents the results from estimating a logistic regression where the dependent variable is equal to 
one if the university had a severe deficiency; zero otherwise (FS WEAK). For brevity, I only 
include the results after estimating backward elimination in Table 5. Control variables are 
generally consistent with my primary analysis, except that observations in the post-SOX period 
(SOX) are marginally negatively associated with the likelihood of a deficiency (-1.209; p-
value=0.081). Discussions of the audit committee’s charter (6_AC CHARTER PCT) and 
examination of the university’s financial statement strengths (13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT) are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of a deficiency (-3.223; p-value=0.011 and -2.466; p-
value=0.011, respectively). Although the committee discussed these items late in the year, the 
committee’s focus on these areas results in an improvement in financial reporting quality. 
Discussions regarding non-audit fees (11_NAS PCT), however, are marginally positively 
associated with the likelihood of a deficiency (5.310; p-value=0.062). This indicates that audit 
committees are re-examining the university’s continuing relationship with the external auditors, 
or the auditor’s level of independence, due to issues that arose near year-end.  
Panel B presents the results after estimating Model (1) using backward elimination with COUNT 
FS WEAK as the dependent variable, which examines the severity of internal control problems. 
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Of the five discussion categories that are at least marginally significantly associated with total 
internal control deficiencies, three of these are positively associated with deficiencies. 
Specifically, discussions with external audit (10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT) and regarding internal 
controls (1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT) are positively associated with the total number of 
findings (p-value=0.005 and p-value=0.090, respectively). Finally, the committee evaluates the 
code of conduct in which management is expected to follow as more issues arise, as evidenced by 
the significantly positive coefficient on these discussions (4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT; p-
value=0.004).  
Discussions regarding internal audit (12_IAUD PCT) and executive sessions (9_EXEC SESSION 
PCT), although occurring late during the year, are still negatively associated with improvements 
in the total number of internal control deficiencies (p-value=0.015 and p-value=0.092, 
respectively). These findings suggest that the timing of these discussions serves as an indicator 
about when problems arise and are addressed at the university. 
Quarter One Discussions 
Alternatively, discussions that occur during the first quarter after fiscal year-end provide some 
additional insight regarding how committees are responding to external audit findings presented 
to the Board after year-end. Therefore, I re-estimate Model (1) where discussion variables are 
measured using minutes from meetings that occurred during the first quarter after fiscal year-end 
(year t+1). The dependent variable and control variables are still measured in year t. 
Table 6 presents the results from estimating Model (1) based on first quarter discussions. Panel A 
presents the results from estimating a logistic regression where the dependent variable is equal to 
one if the university had a severe deficiency; zero otherwise (FS WEAK). Similar to my fourth 
quarter analysis in section 6.2, the direction and significance of the control variables are 
consistent with my primary analysis. Universities that had problems in the prior year focus on 
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remedying problems by meeting with internal audit (12_IAUD PCT) and conducting formal audit 
committee meetings (8_APPROVE MEETING PCT) as evidenced by the positive association 
between the likelihood of a deficiency and these discussions (2.854; p-value=0.026 and 2.142; p-
value=0.062, respectively). Committees are more likely to focus on internal controls themselves, 
and shift focus away from discussing financial statements (13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT) in the 
first quarter following internal control deficiencies, as evidenced by the significantly negative 
coefficient on financial statement discussions (-2.391; p-value=0.029). 
Panel B presents the results from estimating Model (1) with COUNT FS WEAK as the dependent 
variable. I find that committees are decreasing their discussions related to internal controls 
(1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT; p-value<0.001) in the first quarter after problems are identified. 
It is likely that committees are instead addressing issues as they are identified, for example, 
during the end of the prior year (Table 5, Panel B). The remaining quarter 1 discussion variables 
are not significantly associated with COUNT FS WEAK, suggesting that audit committees are 









The audit committee is considered “one of the most reliable guardians of the public interest” who 
serves to “protect and preserve the integrity of America’s financial reporting process” (Levitt 
2000). Yet, it is still unclear how audit committees actually fulfill this role. Prior research has 
focused on actions and characteristics of the committee that are directly observable such as size, 
number of meetings, and composition (e.g. Klein 2002; DeZoort et al. 2002; Carcello and Neal 
2003). However, because some actions, such as meeting frequency, can be associated with 
positive or negative outcomes, users cannot determine whether meeting frequency should be 
associated with positive or negative financial reporting outcomes. Therefore, prior studies that 
make recommendations on these observable characteristics may be misleading. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the characteristics of audit committee meetings by 
examining audit committee minutes. It is also the first study to directly examine audit committee 
deliberations and their impact on financial reporting quality (as proxied by internal control 
deficiencies).   
In this study, I find that audit committees most frequently discuss internal audit testing plans and 
findings, internal controls, and financial statements. Over 50 percent of meetings include external 
auditor discussions, and slightly less than half of the meeting minutes undergo a formal approval 
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process. However, not all of these actions directly translate into improved financial reporting 
quality, as proxied by a reduction in internal control deficiencies. I find that discussions about the 
identification of the committee’s financial expert, internal controls, and discussions regarding the 
audit committee charter are associated with a lower likelihood of severe deficiencies. 
Additionally, discussions regarding the financial statements and identification of the committee’s 
financial expert are associated with fewer internal control problems whereas discussions 
regarding non-audit fees are positively associated with the number of internal control 
deficiencies. In terms of university characteristics, larger universities are more likely to report an 
internal control deficiency (and number of internal control deficiencies). The university’s change 
in net assets, one of my risk-based measures, is negatively associated with the likelihood of a 
deficiency. Larger auditors are associated with a lower likelihood of an internal control 
deficiency. Entities that receive a larger portion of their funding from private sources are less 
likely to report a deficiency. Finally, internal control deficiencies are more likely to occur during 
the 2008 recession. 
This study has interesting implications for researchers, standard setters, and audit committees. 
Many of the audit committee actions that I find associated with internal control deficiencies 
cannot be captured by the proxies that are used in current studies. These discussions continue to 
be significantly associated with internal control findings even after controlling for committee 
meeting frequency, which is commonly used in the literature to proxy for audit committee 
oversight (Carcello et al. 2011). I provide information to standard setters who are considering 
increased audit committee disclosures and specifically, which actions may increase the 
effectiveness of audit committees (SEC 2015). Finally, I provide some insight to audit 
committees about which actions are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of internal 
control deficiencies. The disconnect between the items discussed most frequently and those that 
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are associated with findings suggests that committees should consider re-aligning their 
discussions with those that have the most impact on internal controls.   
In addition to my contribution to the audit committee literature, I also highlight an additional 
approach to analyzing textual data. The LIWC software is an inexpensive and user-friendly tool 
that can be used in a wide variety of settings. It also does not have a limit to the number of 
characters that can be analyzed, which is a drawback to other commonly-used applications. 
Additionally, I demonstrate an alternative data source that can be used to provide information 
about the actions of audit committee members. These minutes, as well as those for a number of 
other public-sector organizations, are publicly available on the organization’s websites and can be 
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LIWC Search Engine Library Definitions 
Category Key Search Phrase (s) 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS adequacy of controls 
audit finding* 























prevent and detect fraud 
prevent fraud 
related-party 














4_CODE OF CONDUCT code* of conduct 
code* of ethics 
5_MGT OVERSIGHT meet privately with management 
meet with management 
met privately with executive 
met privately with management 
met with executive 
met with management 
tone at the top 
6_AC CHARTER audit committee responsibilit* 
charter 
7_EXPERT Expert Financial 
financial expert* 
financially literate 
8_APPROVE MEETING approve* minutes 
approve* the minutes 
minutes of the meeting 
were approved 
9_EXEC SESSION executive session* 
meet privately with executive 
meet privately with management 
met privately with management 




Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged with 
Governance 
effectiveness of the audit committee 
engagement letter 
evaluate audit* 
evaluate audit* independence 
evaluate independence 
management letter* 
manual journal entr* 
met privately with Deloitte 
met privately with EY 
met privately with KPMG 
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met privately with PwC 
 met privately with the audit* 
 met with Deloitte 
 met with EY 
 met with KPMG 
 met with PwC 
 met with the audit* 
 passed adjustment* 
 peer review 
 peer-review 
 preapprov* audit 
 present audit 
 present the audit 
 private session 
 review audit report* 
 rotat* 
 scope of the audit 
 section 260 
 selection criteria 
 selection of the external 
 selection of the independent 
 Statement on Auditing Standards 
 unadjusted differences 




chief audit executive 
internal audit 
13_FIN STATEMENTS accru* 
alternative accounting treatment* 
audit difference* 


















The above listed items and categories outline the specific phrases used in the LIWC 2015 
software to categorize audit committee minutes. *indicates that all word forms/tenses were 





University Listing and Sample Period 
University Sample Period 
University System of Arizona 06/30/2006 – 06/30/2016 
University of California 06/30/1998 – 06/30/2017 
Connecticut State University System 06/30/2012 – 06/30/2016 
University of Florida 06/30/2006 – 06/30/2016 
Florida Polytechnic University 04/30/2013 – 04/30/2017 
University System of Georgia 06/30/1996 – 06/30/2016 
University of Hawaii 06/30/2004 – 06/30/2017 
University of Houston System 08/31/2013 – 08/31/2016 
University System of Idaho 06/30/2007 – 06/30/2016 
University of Illinois 06/30/2010 – 06/30/2017 
University System of Iowa 06/30/2008 – 06/30/2017 
University System of Kansas 06/30/2012 – 06/30/2016 
University of Kentucky 06/30/2008 – 06/30/2016 
Kentucky State University 06/30/2013 – 06/30/2015 
University of Louisville 06/30/2008 – 06/30/2015 
University of Maine System 06/30/2008 – 06/30/2016 
University System of Maryland 06/30/2013 – 06/30/2016 
University of Massachusetts System 06/30/2005 – 06/30/2016 
Miami University of Ohio 06/30/2009 – 06/30/2017 
University of Minnesota 06/30/2005 – 06/30/2016 
Nevada System of Higher Education 06/30/2007 – 06/30/2016 
University System of New Hampshire 06/30/2015 – 06/30/2016 
University of New Mexico 06/30/2011 – 06/30/2017 
University of North Carolina 06/30/2006 – 06/30/2017 
North Dakota University System 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
University of North Florida 06/30/2002 – 06/30/2017 
Northern Illinois University 06/30/2004 – 06/30/2016 
Ohio State University 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
University of Oregon 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
Oregon State University 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
Pennsylvania State University 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2017 
Portland State University 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
Purdue University 06/30/2012 – 06/30/2016 
University of Southern Indiana 06/30/2003 – 06/30/2016 
State University of New York 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
University of Tennessee 06/30/2009 – 06/30/2014 
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University Listing and Sample Period 
University of Toledo 06/30/2016 – 06/30/2016 
University of Texas System 08/31/2006 – 08/31/2016 
University of Connecticut 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2016 
University of North Texas System 08/31/2014 – 08/31/2016 
University of Vermont and State Agricultural College 06/30/2006 – 06/30/2017 
University of Virginia 06/30/1997 – 06/30/2016  
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 06/30/2002 – 06/30/2017 
University of Washington 06/30/2014 – 06/30/2017 
University of Wisconsin System 06/30/2006 – 06/30/2016 
  
This Appendix includes a listing of all universities used in my sample and the corresponding 
fiscal-year ends covered in the audit committee minutes. Audit committee minutes were obtained 









FS WEAK An indicator variable equal to one if the university reported a 
severe deficiency in internal controls over financial 
reporting (significant deficiency or material weakness); 
zero otherwise. 
SA WEAK An indicator variable equal to one if the university reported a 
severe deficiency in internal controls over compliance 
(significant deficiency or material weakness); zero 
otherwise. 
COUNT FS WEAK The sum of the total number of significant deficiencies and 
material weaknesses in internal controls over financial 
reporting (in excess of zero). 
SIZE The natural log of total revenues. 
LINVEST The natural log of the year-end value of financial 
investments. 
TLTA Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
ROTA The ratio of total change in net position (net income) 
divided by total assets. 
SWITCH An indicator variable equal to one if the client switched 
auditors during year t; zero otherwise. 
BIG N An indicator variable equal to one if the client is audited by 
a Big 4 auditor in year t; zero otherwise. 
NUMBER OF 
MEETINGS 
Total number of meetings held by the audit committee 
during the year 
SOX An indicator variable that equals one for university-year 
observations in the post-SOX time period (after 2002); zero 
otherwise. 
CRISIS An indicator variable equal to one for university-year 
observations during 2008 and 2009; zero otherwise. 
DOCTORAL An indicator variable equal to one for universities classified 
as Doctoral/Research Universities; zero otherwise.   
PUBLIC PCT The percentage of total revenues received from federal, 
state and local government. 







Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
High or very high research universities 160 
Exclude: Universities without audit committee minutes available online (79) 
Exclude: Universities without an audit committee (4) 
Exclude: Universities without Board minutes available online (1) 
Total universities with committee minutes available online  76 
  
University-years with minutes available online 389 
Exclude: University-years missing financial statement information (26) 
Exclude: University-years missing Single Audit reports (33) 
Final Sample 330 
    
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Median Std Dev 
SIZE 21.281 21.377 1.231 
LINVEST 0.241 0.219 0.165 
TLTA 0.399 0.370 0.177 
ROTA 0.032 0.029 0.215 
SWITCH 0.155 0.000 0.362 
BIG N 0.209 0.000 0.407 
SOX 0.958 1.000 0.202 
CRISIS 0.130 0.000 0.337 
DOCTORAL 0.900 1.000 0.300 
PUBLIC PCT 0.428 0.435 0.209 
PRIVATE PCT 0.097 0.062 0.199 
FS WEAK 0.358 0.000 0.480 
SA WEAK 0.506 1.000 0.501 
COUNT FS WEAKa 3.610 2.000 1.000 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS 4.318 4.000 1.966 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT 0.615 0.667 0.345 
2_FRAUD RISK PCT 0.317 0.250 0.338 
3_ASSESS RISK PCT 0.495 0.500 0.363 
4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT 0.096 0.000 0.208 
5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT 0.016 0.000 0.071 
6_AC CHARTER PCT 0.202 0.143 0.258 
7_EXPERT PCT 0.032 0.000 0.134 
8_APPROVE MEETING PCT 0.498 0.528 0.439 
9_EXEC SESSION PCT 0.291 0.000 0.394 
10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT 0.539 0.500 0.333 
11_NAS PCT 0.022 0.000 0.083 
12_IAUD PCT 0.709 0.833 0.351 
13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT 0.670 0.750 0.326 
14_FIN STRENGTH PCT 0.157 0.000 0.242 
    
a Values for COUNT FS WEAK are based on 118 observations, where FS WEAK is not equal to zero.  
In this table, Panel A describes the steps and data screens that I use to gather my sample for primary 
analysis. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for each university-year observation.  In this panel, 
variables ending in “PCT” are indicator variables that are summed by year and divided by the total number 
of meetings that occurred that year. Detailed variable definitions for each of the variables used in my 






            
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1  SIZE  0.211 0.044 0.079 -0.041 0.329 -0.024 0.001 0.636 -0.320 
2 LINVEST 0.211  -0.212 0.088 -0.058 0.310 0.009 -0.012 0.082 -0.314 
3 TLTA 0.044 -0.212  -0.011 0.098 0.226 0.239 -0.064 0.007 -0.089 
4 ROTA 0.079 0.088 -0.011  -0.121 -0.012 0.004 -0.008 0.114 0.047 
5 SWITCH -0.041 -0.058 0.098 -0.121  0.089 0.007 -0.041 0.059 -0.066 
6 BIG N 0.329 0.310 0.226 -0.012 0.089  0.108 0.000 0.072 -0.311 
7 SOX -0.024 0.009 0.239 0.004 0.007 0.108  0.081 -0.070 -0.082 
8 CRISIS 0.001 -0.012 -0.064 -0.008 -0.041 0.000 0.081  0.009 0.087 
9 DOCTORAL 0.636 0.082 0.007 0.114 0.059 0.072 -0.070 0.009  -0.232 
10 PUBLIC PCT -0.320 -0.314 -0.089 0.047 -0.066 -0.311 -0.082 0.087 -0.232  
11 PRIVATE PCT -0.131 0.057 -0.158 0.229 -0.065 -0.058 0.014 -0.033 -0.090 0.521 
12 FS WEAK 0.210 -0.058 -0.137 -0.106 0.013 -0.104 -0.125 0.106 0.122 0.100 
13 SA WEAK 0.183 -0.193 -0.130 -0.073 0.003 -0.118 0.003 0.040 0.115 0.227 
14 COUNT FS WEAK 0.201 -0.211 -0.129 -0.035 -0.060 -0.105 -0.179 0.059 0.097 0.236 
15 NUMBER OF MEETINGS 0.260 -0.057 -0.057 0.040 -0.291 0.069 0.042 0.001 -0.003 -0.015 
16 1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT 0.165 0.108 -0.002 -0.016 0.052 0.096 0.196 0.078 0.269 -0.106 
17 2_FRAUD RISK PCT -0.034 -0.048 0.119 -0.077 -0.012 0.009 0.121 0.005 0.028 -0.012 
18 3_ASSESS RISK PCT 0.050 0.205 0.197 -0.059 -0.080 0.199 0.103 0.009 0.149 -0.141 
19 4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT -0.084 0.047 0.020 -0.008 0.003 0.015 0.080 0.079 0.047 0.026 
20 5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT -0.011 0.130 0.117 -0.011 -0.025 0.121 0.048 -0.049 0.076 -0.019 
21 6_AC CHARTER PCT -0.012 0.101 0.060 0.026 -0.068 -0.052 0.035 0.020 0.055 -0.022 
22 7_EXPERT PCT 0.286 0.140 0.177 -0.027 -0.072 0.260 0.051 0.115 0.080 -0.108 
23 8_APPROVE MEETING PCT 0.026 0.064 -0.061 0.010 -0.061 -0.168 -0.001 -0.032 -0.001 -0.121 
24 9_EXEC SESSION PCT 0.131 0.331 0.101 0.026 -0.004 0.233 -0.147 -0.064 0.195 -0.270 
25 10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT 0.090 -0.025 0.072 -0.034 0.041 0.124 -0.008 0.037 0.111 0.010 
26 11_NAS PCT 0.086 0.185 0.080 -0.012 -0.027 0.282 0.055 0.023 0.087 -0.084 
27 12_IAUD PCT 0.216 0.092 0.052 -0.103 -0.073 0.193 0.122 0.072 0.086 0.003 
28 13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT -0.082 0.131 0.036 0.071 -0.062 0.156 0.285 0.012 0.009 -0.058 
29 14_FIN STRENGTH PCT -0.148 -0.159 -0.026 0.033 -0.055 -0.085 0.090 -0.016 -0.015 0.054 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix 
            
   11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1  SIZE -0.131 0.210 0.183 0.201 0.260 0.165 -0.034 0.050 -0.084 -0.011 
2 LINVEST 0.057 -0.058 -0.193 -0.211 -0.057 0.108 -0.048 0.205 0.047 0.130 
3 TLTA -0.158 -0.137 -0.130 -0.129 -0.057 -0.002 0.119 0.197 0.020 0.117 
4 ROTA 0.229 -0.106 -0.073 -0.035 0.040 -0.016 -0.077 -0.059 -0.008 -0.011 
5 SWITCH -0.065 0.013 0.003 -0.060 -0.291 0.052 -0.012 -0.080 0.003 -0.025 
6 BIG N -0.058 -0.104 -0.118 -0.105 0.069 0.096 0.009 0.199 0.015 0.121 
7 SOX 0.014 -0.125 0.003 -0.179 0.042 0.196 0.121 0.103 0.080 0.048 
8 CRISIS -0.033 0.106 0.040 0.059 0.001 0.078 0.005 0.009 0.079 -0.049 
9 DOCTORAL -0.090 0.122 0.115 0.097 -0.003 0.269 0.028 0.149 0.047 0.076 
10 PUBLIC PCT 0.521 0.100 0.227 0.236 -0.015 -0.106 -0.012 -0.141 0.026 -0.019 
11 PRIVATE PCT  -0.068 -0.075 -0.015 -0.024 -0.102 -0.042 -0.048 0.005 -0.020 
12 FS WEAK -0.068  0.396 0.479 0.140 -0.143 -0.129 -0.128 -0.125 -0.111 
13 SA WEAK -0.075 0.396  0.261 0.015 -0.066 -0.052 -0.089 0.015 0.045 
14 COUNT FS WEAK -0.015 0.479 0.261  0.124 -0.069 -0.088 -0.197 -0.094 -0.074 
15 NUMBER OF MEETINGS -0.024 0.140 0.015 0.124  -0.134 -0.028 -0.129 -0.129 -0.003 
16 1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT -0.102 -0.143 -0.066 -0.069 -0.134  0.316 0.302 0.136 0.110 
17 2_FRAUD RISK PCT -0.042 -0.129 -0.052 -0.088 -0.028 0.316  0.315 0.265 0.241 
18 3_ASSESS RISK PCT -0.048 -0.128 -0.089 -0.197 -0.129 0.302 0.315  0.239 0.233 
19 4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT 0.005 -0.125 0.015 -0.094 -0.129 0.136 0.265 0.239  0.213 
20 5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT -0.020 -0.111 0.045 -0.074 -0.003 0.110 0.241 0.233 0.213  
21 6_AC CHARTER PCT -0.029 -0.181 0.019 -0.094 -0.113 0.231 0.256 0.271 0.232 0.224 
22 7_EXPERT PCT -0.027 -0.115 -0.126 -0.066 0.046 0.196 0.284 0.180 0.163 0.103 
23 8_APPROVE MEETING PCT -0.056 0.000 -0.075 -0.155 0.112 0.042 0.267 0.035 -0.046 0.002 
24 9_EXEC SESSION PCT -0.064 0.034 -0.113 -0.025 -0.179 0.011 -0.142 0.099 0.009 0.127 
25 10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT -0.046 -0.074 -0.025 -0.009 -0.205 0.477 0.327 0.368 0.165 0.161 
26 11_NAS PCT 0.007 -0.080 -0.111 -0.066 0.153 0.112 0.116 0.174 0.179 0.273 
27 12_IAUD PCT -0.130 -0.046 0.085 0.115 0.013 0.350 0.328 0.276 0.114 0.127 
28 13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT -0.017 -0.171 -0.048 -0.241 -0.138 0.445 0.380 0.326 0.210 0.104 





    
  Estimate Standard Error P-value 
Panel A – Full model    
SIZE 0.554 0.218 0.012 
LINVEST 1.766 1.274 0.167 
TLTA -0.820 1.309 0.532 
ROTA -3.932 1.776 0.028 
SWITCH 0.293 0.455 0.520 
BIG N -0.794 0.508 0.119 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS 0.132 0.096 0.168 
SOX -0.345 0.765 0.653 
CRISIS 1.047 0.473 0.027 
DOCTORAL 0.118 0.774 0.879 
PUBLIC PCT 1.594 1.002 0.113 
PRIVATE PCT -3.778 2.219 0.090 
SA WEAK 1.733 0.373 <0.001 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT -0.883 0.560 0.116 
2_FRAUD RISK PCT 0.262 0.552 0.636 
3_ASSESS RISK PCT 0.076 0.515 0.883 
4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT -0.805 0.802 0.316 
5_MGT OVERSIGHT PCT -3.467 2.697 0.200 
6_AC CHARTER PCT -1.360 0.700 0.053 
7_EXPERT PCT -2.921 1.630 0.074 
8_APPROVE MEETING PCT 0.176 0.386 0.648 
9_EXEC SESSION PCT 0.567 0.465 0.223 
10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT 0.616 0.645 0.340 
11_NAS PCT 1.439 2.461 0.559 
12_IAUD PCT -0.555 0.492 0.260 
13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT -0.357 0.631 0.572 
14_FIN STRENGTH PCT 1.112 0.824 0.178 
    
Observations 330   
Pseudo R-squared 0.421   
ROC Curve 0.840   





TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Severe Deficiencies 
Panel B – Selected model    
SIZE 0.613 0.159 0.000 
LINVEST 1.729 1.058 0.103 
ROTA -3.329 1.624 0.041 
BIG N -0.989 0.413 0.017 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS  0.115 0.077 0.136 
CRISIS  0.976 0.443 0.028 
PUBLIC PCT 1.490 0.923 0.107 
PRIVATE PCT -3.702 1.976 0.062 
SA WEAK  1.610 0.338 <0.001 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT -0.913 0.461 0.048 
6_AC CHARTER PCT -1.608 0.627 0.011 
7_EXPERT PCT -2.957 1.761 0.094 
9_EXEC SESSION PCT 0.615 0.401 0.126 
14_FIN STRENGTH PCT 1.315 0.704 0.063 
    
Observations 330   
Pseudo R-squared 0.397   
ROC Curve 0.827   
    
The following table presents the results from estimating a logistic regression model where the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the university had a severe deficiency in internal controls 
over financial reporting (significant deficiency or material weakness); zero otherwise. Panel A presents 
the results for the full model. Panel B only includes variables that are retained after estimating a backward 
elimination regression model. Presented p-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
university and year. Detailed variable definitions for each of the variables used in my analyses are provided 




TABLE 4  
Total Deficiencies  
    
 Estimate Standard Error P-value 
SIZE 0.400 0.168 0.017 
LINVEST -0.235 0.583 0.687 
TLTA -0.829 0.296 0.005 
BIG N  0.916 0.180 <0.001 
PUBLIC PCT  -0.897 0.205 <0.001 
3_ASSESS RISK PCT  0.394 0.402 0.327 
7_EXPERT PCT  -2.745 0.984 0.005 
8_APPROVE MEETING PCT  0.475 0.649 0.465 
10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT 0.134 0.313 0.668 
11_NAS PCT  0.400 0.168 0.017 
12_IAUD PCT  -0.235 0.583 0.687 
13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT  -0.829 0.296 0.005 
    
Observations 118   
Pseudo R-squared 0.151   
    
The following table presents the results from estimating a negative binomial regression model where the 
dependent variable is equal to the total number of significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (in 
excess of zero) in internal controls over financial reporting. For brevity, this table only includes variables 
that are retained after estimating a backward elimination regression model. Presented p-values are two-
tailed. Standard errors are clustered by university and year. Detailed variable definitions for each of the 





Quarter 4 Analyses 
Panel A – Severe Deficiencies    
 Estimate Standard Error P-value 
SIZE 0.449 0.161 0.006 
BIG N  -0.845 0.393 0.033 
SOX  -1.209 0.690 0.081 
CRISIS  1.022 0.449 0.024 
PRIVATE PCT -3.643 1.973 0.066 
SA WEAK  1.778 0.340 <0.001 
6_AC CHARTER PCT -3.223 1.252 0.011 
11_NAS PCT 5.310 2.837 0.062 
13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT -2.466 0.967 0.011 
    
Observations 272   
Pseudo R-squared 0.378   
ROC Curve 0.821   
    
Panel B – Total Deficiencies    
SIZE 0.442 0.100 <0.001 
LINVEST -1.010 1.057 0.339 
BIG N -0.855 0.490 0.081 
PUBLIC PCT -2.213 0.744 0.003 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT  1.032 0.610 0.090 
3_ASSESS RISK PCT 0.830 0.543 0.127 
4_CODE OF CONDUCT PCT 2.590 0.888 0.004 
9_EXEC SESSION PCT -0.748 0.444 0.092 
10_ADT OVERSIGHT PCT 1.064 0.374 0.005 
12_IAUD PCT -1.209 0.498 0.015 
    
Observations 107   
Pseudo R-squared 0.163   
    
The following table presents the results from my fourth quarter discussion analyses. For brevity, this table 
only includes variables that are retained after estimating a backward elimination regression model. Panel 
A presents the results from estimating a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the university had a severe deficiency in internal controls over financial 
reporting (significant deficiency or material weakness); zero otherwise. Panel B presents the results from 
estimating a negative binomial regression model where the dependent variable is equal to the total number 
of significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (in excess of zero) in internal controls over financial 
reporting. All audit committee discussion variables are based on Quarter 4 of year t. All other variables 
are measured for year-end in period t. Presented p-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
university and year. Detailed variable definitions for each of the variables used in my analyses are provided 





Quarter 1 Analyses 
Panel A – Severe Deficiencies    
  Estimate Standard Error P-value 
ROTA -4.471 2.369 0.060 
SA WEAK 2.685 0.365 <0.001 
6_AC CHARTER PCT -2.693 1.685 0.111 
8_APPROVE MEETING PCT  2.142 1.140 0.062 
2_FRAUD RISK PCT -2.140 1.418 0.133 
13_FIN STATEMENTS PCT -2.391 1.088 0.029 
12_IAUD PCT 2.854 1.269 0.026 
    
Observations 229   
Pseudo R-squared 0.436   
ROC Curve 0.839   
    
Panel B – Total Deficiencies    
SIZE 0.464 0.114 <0.001 
LINVEST -1.518 1.119 0.175 
NUMBER OF MEETINGS  1.984 0.378 <0.001 
PUBLIC PCT  2.009 0.590 0.001 
1_INTERNAL CONTROLS PCT -1.774 0.399 <0.001 
3_ASSESS RISK PCT -1.015 0.751 0.176 
12_IAUD PCT -1.518 1.119 0.175 
    
    
Observations 94   
Pseudo R-squared 0.152   
    
The following table presents the results from estimating my first quarter analyses. For brevity, this table 
only includes variables that are retained after estimating a backward elimination regression model. Panel 
A presents the results from estimating a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the university had a severe deficiency in internal controls over financial 
reporting (significant deficiency or material weakness); zero otherwise. Panel B presents the results from 
estimating a negative binomial regression model where the dependent variable is equal to the total number 
of significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (in excess of zero) in internal controls over financial 
reporting. All audit committee discussion variables are based on Quarter 1 of year t+1. All other variables 
are measured for year-end in period t. Presented p-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered by 
university and year. Detailed variable definitions for each of the variables used in my analyses are provided 
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